

India's 'Strategy' for its Larger and Smaller Hostile Neighbours, China and Pakistan

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Introduction

Today, India, which has harboured global power ambitions by its nature, is absorbed in boosting its economic and military strength. Increasingly, elite Indian figures position their country in the global arena beyond the subcontinent. However, it is unclear whether India has concrete strategy to be a global power in spite of its rich strategic culture and discourse. Having established strategic partnerships with almost all powers, India seems to have difficulty in building and securing stable relationships with its traditional adversarial neighbours: China and Pakistan. On the one hand, China, India's larger neighbour, has been recognised as the greatest threat in terms of war. China, which defeated India in its border war in 1962, is maintaining aggressive stances by land and by sea surrounding India. The U.S. and Japan, showing growing concern about Chinese activities, try to woo India and solicit its greater role in the Indo-Pacific. On the other hand, Pakistan, a smaller neighbour, has posed a threat by terrorism since it was defeated in the third war with India in 1971. Now, India must manage its relationship with Pakistan as well as China if it is to play some important role in Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal. This paper, which emphasises India's strategy to these two hostile neighbours, will clarify how India characterises and executes its political, economical and military relationship with two neighbours with a

view to fulfilling its ambition to be a global power.


Becoming a global power

India has boasted its overwhelming national strength in South Asia since its independence. No other South Asian state approaches India in terms of military power as well as economic power. Pakistan has challenged Indian regional hegemony or dominance in three conventional wars, in 1947, 1965 and 1971, but India defeated each enterprise. The last war in 1971, which led to independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh, cemented India's superiority in the region. India is indisputably a regional power.

Around the turn of the 21st century, however, India began to be recognised and regarded as an actor in a broader arena. Of course, India itself had great potential to be a major power; it had long harboured great power ambitions¹. Nevertheless, it remained economically weak over a long period of time, which caused its marginalisation during the Cold War. India's economic reforms, conducted since 1991, have brightened the situation. The overall sustained high economic growth rates, despite some fluctuation, (See Table 1) have created the basis for a bold and innovative Indian foreign policy (Mohan 2007: 392). This new and better economic climate has made India optimistic about achieving its goal of emerging as a global major power (Ganguly et al. 2007: 11).

The steady economic rate has enabled India to enhance its military power. India's military expenditures have increased year by year (See Table 2). Consequently, India's military expenditures and GDP are now ranked among the top 10 in the world, which means that its hard power is moving toward the scale of that of the global major powers. That boost of hard power has also contributed to the Indian elites' confidence in national

Table 1: India's GDP growth (annual %)




Source: The World Bank Indicator (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/>)

capabilities and has provided the leverage to pursue India's foreign policies in its favour. Every existing major power is competing with others in approaching India for its own gain. Each top leader of P5 countries paid a visit to New Delhi during the last half year of 2010. U.S. President Barack Obama said that "India is not simply an emerging power but now it is a world power", and supported the addition of India as a permanent member of United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in principle, when he visited New Delhi in November 2010.

There might be some hesitation or refusal from the Indian side to be regarded as a global player, related to the fear of attaching more global responsibilities (Miller 2013: 18). However, the dominant discourse among today's Indian political and strategic elite demonstrates that India is eager

Table 2: India's military expenditures (US \$)

US \$ m



Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (<http://milexdata.sipri.org/>)

Figures are in US \$m, at constant 2011 prices and exchange rates.

to fulfil its ambition to be a global power. In fact, India repeatedly stands on its rights to a permanent seat on the UNSC and its membership of multilateral export controls regimes. The point in question here is whether India has a strategy to realise its goal.

Discourse on 'strategy' in India

Turning our eyes on today's Indian media, one readily understands how Indian people think kindly of a discussion of strategy. Not a few articles by various academicians, journalists, military veterans, former ambassadors and so on address the subject of what kind of strategy India should embrace in the current regional and global environment². Actually, India has

observed a rich tradition of strategic culture. A famous ancient Indian strategic text, *The Arthashastra*, which is said to have been written by Kautilya, the advisor of Emperor Chandragupta Maurya in late fourth century BC, is now being rediscovered and reevaluated by Indian practitioners and scholars (Gautam 2013: 21-28).

The Arthashastra dwells on political and diplomatic means as well as military means to achieve the national interest. Kautilya advises six methods of making peace, waging war, staying quiet, preparing for war, seeking support, and dual policy depending on the situations (Rangarajan 1992: 542-744). In other words, he counsels the monarch to act pragmatically according to circumstances, from peace to war. It is this flexibility of policy that most Indian strategists presuppose subconsciously. They discuss matters of the way to achieve Indian national interest pragmatically.

In spite of many articles on strategy derived from the classic, however, most contemporary strategists admit and lament the lack or uncertainty of Indian official strategy, above all, a grand strategy (Pant 2009; Mohan 2010). India has built and strengthened 'strategic partnership' relations with almost all major and emerging powers in the world since the end of the last century³. Nevertheless, it does not mean that India has established a clear grand design to become a global power. For the time being, India is apparently striving to make use of different strategic relationships with different partners to its own advantage. Whereas the U.S. is recognised as a necessary partner to raise India's status in the existing global order, China which poses a security threat to India as described later is a camp of emerging powers. It is apparently rational for today's India to cooperate with the U.S. and the other western powers in the field of investment, UNSC reform and weapon development etc., but it cannot do so without the

relationship with China or the other emerging and developing countries over some key issues in the global economic order, such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), WTO and IMF (ITO 2013: 122).

As a result, India is cautious about becoming involved in a specific power relationship, seeking instead to keep any relation balanced between friend and ally. It is that 'strategic autonomy' which India should adopt as a principal guidance as emphasised in *Nonalignment 2.0* published by Centre for Policy Research, India's nongovernmental think tank in early 2012⁴. Although this semi-official report is appreciated as an initial attempt to clarify India's national strategy (Basrur 2012), not a few strategists have taken exception to the concept of strategic autonomy (Ganguly 2012; Tellis 2012). The former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra, who spoke at the launch of the report, questioned its view that India not take sides in the rivalry between China and the U.S., suggesting that India's priority should be a closer relationship with the latter.

Even if 'strategic autonomy' were a basic principle in the current global and regional environment, there will be no assurance of the future. India will not be able to maintain 'strategic autonomy' when China develops further militarily and economically and it starts to challenge the Indian land and sea sphere openly. India will also be at a loss when the so-called G2 scenario, in which China and the U.S. cooperate closely to solve global problems, becomes a reality or when another cold war situation develops between both superpowers.

In spite of its overly abstract description as well as short-range viewpoint on the global power games, however, *Nonalignment 2.0* gives a detailed and concrete recommendations related to the relationships with two Indian neighbours, China and Pakistan, both of which are the only

countries with which India has fought wars since its independence. The Indian strategy toward each is explained in the following sections.

China

The relationship between India and China has been an up and down affair. China was India's partner in the early stage of its independence. The first Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru did his best to attract the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Consequently, bilateral relations were generally amicable in the 1950s, as symbolised by the agreement embodying the five principles of peaceful co-existence or 'Panch Sheel'.

Those circumstances, however, began to change around the end of the 1950s because of Tibet and other unresolved border issues. Tensions escalated into a full-scale border conflict in 1962, when India was defeated completely. Diplomatic relations were severed, not to be restored until the respective ambassadors returned to the capitals in 1976. Even so, it was impossible for each to improve bilateral relations within the context of the Cold War, the U.S.–China–Pakistan coalition against the Soviet–India tandem.

The beginning of the end of the Cold War, therefore, enabled the leaders to move mutually closer. In 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing, which was "a timely diplomatic move for stabilising the strategic environment in the Asian situation in the context of the rapidly changing world situation" (Dixit 2003: 183). Although India's nuclear tests in 1998, justified by emphasising the 'China threat'⁵, inflamed Chinese leadership temporarily, the relationship recovered again soon thereafter.

Since the beginning of this century, India and China have improved their economic, political and military relations more spectacularly. Above

all, trade relations, which were practically nonexistent during the Cold War era, have expanded. China has been the largest trading partner for India since 2008, showing an excess of imports for India. Summit diplomacy has also begun to be undertaken actively, which caused the establishment of ‘Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’ when Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited New Delhi in 2005.

However, one cannot conclude that India and China have become friendly. In fact, neither side has been assuaged of doubts completely. The border dispute, which escalated to war, has not been resolved, although the framework of high-level boundary talks between the special representatives has been maintained. In this regard, the Annual Reports of Indian Ministry of Defence (MOD) of recent years describe positively.

Although the unresolved boundary dispute between India and China has been a factor in India’s security calculus, India has a strategic and cooperative partnership with China, in which the effort has been to work on areas of mutual interest which would enable both countries to pursue common goals of growth and development (MOD 2013: 6).

It might be readily apparent for the Government of India (GOI) to seek to downplay sporadically flaring military tensions along the India–China border. Although Indian media sensationally reported Chinese ‘incursions’ into the Indian side in 2009 and 2013, the GOI maintained that such reports should be seen in the context of India and China not having a mutually agreed Line of Actual Control (LAC). It is noteworthy that both India and China remained in control without exchanging so much as a bullet even in crisis as contrasted against the case of India and Pakistan, as described later. GOI seems to base upon the concept that the border

dispute with China is manageable through the existing bilateral mechanism.

However cautious about expressing alarm officially, the unresolved boundary dispute 'has been a factor in India's security calculus'. The semi-official report *Nonalignment 2.0* is more articulate, concrete and detailed.

There is the possibility that China might resort to territorial grabs. The most likely areas for such bite-sized operations are those parts of Line of Actual Control (LAC) where both sides have different notions of where the LAC actually runs (Khilnani et al. 2012:40).

The report presents a proposal for adopting different strategies depending on types of Chinese possible offensive. In the case of limited land-grabs by China, India should 'undertake similar action across the LAC: a strategy of *quid pro quo*', identifying and earmarking the advantageous areas for limited offensive operations on its part. It is also recognised that such a strategy will require the upgrading of the Indian border infrastructure, which trails that of China (Khilnani et al. 2012: 41). That might be one reason India did not adopt a retaliatory strategy toward the 'Chinese side' across the LAC when the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) 'intruded' into the Indian side and set up tents in 2013. The defensive strategy, facing off against Chinese in the same place without firing, will be the only alternative for India in the immediate future until the strengthening of its border infrastructure.

In the event of a major offensive by China, a less probable scenario, the report frankly acknowledges that India 'cannot resort to a strategy of proportionate response' in light of its power gap in relation to China. It proposes the adoption of three asymmetric strategies to convince China to

back down: triggering an insurgency in Chinese areas such as Tibet, accelerating the integration of Indian frontier regions, and strengthening domination of the Indian Ocean through naval power (Khilnani et al. 2012: 41-42). These pragmatic strategies toward the larger neighbour are admired even by leading strategists (Mohan 2012). For that reason, India should invest in communications infrastructure with frontier regions and should invest in naval capabilities. The percentage of naval allocation in all defence expenditures is increasing year by year⁶.

In addition to border disputes, not a few Indian strategists suspect that China is using neighbouring countries' fear of India to maintain and construct military relationships with them. Above all, China-Pakistan nexus, called 'all-weather friendship' has beset and aggravated India (Singh 2007). Cashing in India's inherent antagonistic relations with Pakistan, it is widely believed that the Establishment in Zhongnanhai has pursued the strategy to confine India within the limited geographic area of South Asia, which has not only contributed to Chinese security itself but also to foiling Indian global ambitions. Actually, China has long supported Pakistan in every field. Pakistan could not have developed its nuclear weapons and missiles without Chinese help. China has also supported Pakistan diplomatically and economically on the Kashmir issue. It is noteworthy that of the five P5 leaders coming to India in 2010, only Premier Wen Jiabao paid a visit to Islamabad after visiting New Delhi. China constructed the strategically important Gwadar port, of which the operation rights were handed over by Pakistan in 2013. Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony expressed 'great concern' about such a development between China and Pakistan. China is also promoting a mega project of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, to connect Gwadar Port and Xinjiang, making huge investment in Pakistan and even in 'Pakistan occupied Kashmir,' which

increases Indian sense of caution.

Moreover, India is growing concerned about Chinese connections with other Indian neighbours. The recent GOI tends to express more severe concern about Chinese growing influence on the traditional Indian sphere than the bilateral border dispute. The Annual Reports of MOD have not referred to Chinese military modernisation for three consecutive years since the version Year 2010–11. Instead, they have started to express some alarm about the expansion of Chinese influence.

India remains conscious and watchful of the implications of China's military profile in the immediate and extended neighbourhood. India is also taking necessary measures to develop the requisite capabilities to counter any adverse impact on its security (MOD 2013: 6).

Actually, India is striving to approach neighbouring countries in opposition of China recently. India has strengthened economic, energy and military cooperation with Myanmar and Bangladesh. On other occasions, India uses a stick rather than a carrot. It is said that India intervened in the internal affairs in Nepal and Bhutan, of which the governments are regarded as not amenable to India⁷. However, such a policy using the dominant position might not be sophisticated and beneficial in the long term. The possibility exists of increasing anti-Indian sentiment in the neighbourhoods.

Recognising the need for a strategy to counter Chinese influence in South Asia, *Nonalignment 2.0* proposes more measured responses: assessing threats, having a credible engagement plan, and following through in its promises (Khilnani et al. 2012: 16-17). Apparently, India has been unable to find answers to questions about how India should respond

effectively to Chinese influence in the Indian neighbourhoods. That will be a more pressing issue for India as competition for access to energy increases in the extended neighbourhood, in South-East Asia, Central Asia, Middle East, and Africa.

In the field of global politics, China is recognised as the largest obstacle hindering India from becoming a global power. China has given only minimal support for India's permanent membership of UNSC of P5. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in 2010, immediately after the U.S. President Obama declared his support for India's membership, repeated the Chinese established term, "China understands and supports India's aspiration to play a greater role in the United Nations, including in the Security Council". It is said that China was the last member that subscribed to a consensus on 2008 'India exemption' in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which enabled India to enter any bilateral negotiations for civil nuclear cooperation without acceding to NPT. China is widely believed to embrace a strategy of containing India narrowly in the subcontinent.

To counter Chinese military and political challenges, *Nonalignment 2.0* presents the initiative 'to develop a diversified network of relations with several major powers'. That will certainly 'help delay, if not deter, the projection of Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean' and 'compel China to exercise restraint in its dealings with India'. However, simultaneously, the report dissuades India from making too close a relationship with them for fear that 'China perceives India as irrevocably committed to anti-India containment ring' (Khilnani et al. 2012: 14). In fact, India became reluctant to be involved in the U.S.–Japan–Australia–India quadrilateral initiative in 2007 which was interpreted as a blatant effort to contain China. Later India has taken a cautious stance about India's expected role in the U.S. 'pivot' in the new 'Indo-Pacific' concept (Chacko 2012) ⁸.

It is true that change of government from Congress to BJP as a result of general election in May 2014 has made a slight course correction, but has not changed the course. On the one hand, Prime Minister Narendra Modi known as a nationalist has adopted stronger security posture vis-à-vis China. He did not overlook Chinese PLA's provocative action during President Xi Jinping's visit to India⁹. The new government has not hesitated to take countermeasures including development of border infrastructure and naval expansion. It has endeavoured to regain its influence over Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and so on, strengthening strategic relationship with leading 'Indo-Pacific' powers, the U.S. Japan and Australia. On the other, Prime Minister Modi as a business-friendly leader recognises that cooperation with China will be essential to boost the Indian economy and realise his 'Make in India' policy. He has decided to invite Chinese huge investments even in infrastructure which were strictly limited because of security concern. Modi administration proclaimed to participate in China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to promote fund-raising. Accordingly, it is not possible that he will jump on board any blatant effort to send a message about 'containing China' that will unavoidably and excessively provoke China (ITO 2014).

A broad consensus exists among mainstream Indian politicians, military planners, and strategists to avert a war, especially full-scale war with the larger neighbour for the moment. It is more rational to manage the relationship with China considering the present power gap as well as the most important partner of global economic order as emerging powers (ITO 2015: 142-149). For that reason, the hardliners have been largely marginalised in Indian strategic circles (Cohen et al. 2010: 13-14). India's pragmatism, rooted in Kautilya, is apparent in the current nuanced policy toward China. How long will such a strategy based on 'strategic

autonomy' be sustainable?

Pakistan

Pakistan has not been regarded by India as an ordinary foreign country. From the Indian perspective, it is part of the Muslim League, which walked away from British India and founded Pakistan, and which is blamed for the tragedy of Partition in 1947. India and Pakistan have forged incompatible national identities or *raison d'être*, pitting a secular nation versus a Muslim nation since then. It is often said that both countries cannot escape their own destiny to fight each other in view of such a particular process of formation of nation-states. When analyzing Indian policy toward Pakistan, it must be regarded as less rational than that toward China¹⁰.

In fact, India and Pakistan fought three full-scale wars in 1947, 1965, and 1971. The last war tore Pakistan apart to give birth to Bangladesh, which delivered a damaging blow to the former in terms of strategy and identity. As a result, attaching its energy to the Kashmir issue as a Muslim nation, Pakistan started its nuclear development in full swing, along with intervention in Indian ethnic conflicts first in Punjab and later in Kashmir. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has assisted Indian insurgent groups militarily for its proxy war with India. Actually, Pakistan's 'bleeding India' strategy, 'cross-border terrorism', has afflicted India strongly.

The nuclearisation of both countries in 1998 has enabled Pakistan to take bolder and more adventurist steps toward India. Pakistan infiltrated its soldiers and militants into Kargil across the Line of Control (LoC), which was controlled by India in 1999. According to the U.S. report, Pakistan Army prepared its nuclear missiles in the face of a fierce Indian counteroffensive during the Kargil conflict (Riedel 2002). In late 2001, Islamic militants, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM),

backed strongly by the ISI made a raid on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, which led to massive military mobilisation and eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation along the LoC and international border for about ten months.

Since that last crisis in 2001–02, however, both countries have changed course completely. The peace process based on a so-called ‘composite dialogue’ started and both nations, including Kashmiris, enjoyed the dividends of relative peace, which they had never experienced before. The ‘long peace’ was brought to an end abruptly by the Mumbai attacks in late 2008 by Pakistani militants who belonged to LeT. Since then, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh repeated attempts to restore the dialogue with Pakistani leaders. At last, a new dialogue framework was agreed and established in 2011. However, the new-born dialogue has been interrupted by reports of an Indian soldier’s beheading and some skirmishes along the LoC in 2013. Having gained a massive electoral victory in May 2014, new Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi invited his Pakistani counterpart Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to his own inauguration ceremony and agreed to hold foreign secretary talks as soon as possible. Nevertheless again, the scheduled dialogue was cancelled abruptly, Indian side condemning Pakistani High Commissioner’s meeting with Kashmiri secessionist leaders. At last in March 2015, foreign secretary level dialogue was held in Islamabad, but there was no tangible result. Even Prime Minister Modi who has been appreciated for his active foreign policy toward major powers and neighbours for the first year of inauguration cannot see a way out of the trap of ‘the familiar roller-coaster with Pakistan’ (Mohan 2015).

It seems abundantly clear that India cannot easily find an answer to Pakistan problems. However, in contrast to its relationship with China, cooperation with Pakistan is not necessarily regarded as necessary for today’s India. Pakistan is too small for emerging India to profit from trade

and investment with it. It is not recognised as a partner to seek the revise of global economic order. From the Indian perspective, Pakistan is projected as merely a worrisome neighbour that sometimes exports terrorism to India. That might be part of the reason that even the official document, The Annual Report of MOD, describes the concern or threat from Pakistan more directly and concretely than that from China.

[S]ecurity concerns vis-à-vis Pakistan remain a cause of concern due to the continuing activities of terrorist organisations functioning on its territories under its control. The existence of terrorist camps across the India-Pak border and the Line of Control (LoC) and continued infiltrations across the LoC continue to demonstrate Pakistan's attitude and approach to terrorist organisations, even though such organisations pose a danger to Pakistan's own social and political fabric. The ambush of Indian troops by a Pakistan Border Action team which crossed the LoC at Mendhar Sector in January, 2013 and heinous killing of two Indian soldiers during this attack, in contravention of all norms of international conduct, have been taken up strongly with the Pakistan Government. It has been conveyed that acts of this nature cannot be accepted and there is need for action to ensure that they do not recur. Heightened vigil is being maintained along the LoC and the situation is being closely monitored. (MOD 2013: 5-6)

It is particularly interesting that no Annual Report since version Year 2005–06 mentions a threat or concern resulting from conventional and nuclear forces of Pakistan at all for eight consecutive years. This can be assumed to reflect what Indian mainstream policy makers really think. It is the cross-border terrorism and adventurism across LoC that Pakistan

poses a security threat to India from their viewpoint¹¹. In this context, internal instabilities in Pakistan are recognised as an alarming development for India. However, as *Nonalignment 2.0* admits frankly, '[t] here is little that India can do either to accelerate or impede a potential implosion of Pakistan' (Khilnani et al. 2012: 19).

In spite of such a negative view on the smaller neighbour, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh believes that it is necessary for India to engage Pakistan if it seeks a stable environment to be a global power. In 2009, he addressed Parliament.

I sincerely believe that India cannot realise its development ambition or its ambition of being a great power, if our neighbourhood remains disturbed as it is, and therefore, it is in our interest to work with all neighbouring countries to ensure a peaceful neighbourhood.... I sincerely believe that it is in our vital interest, therefore, to try again to make peace with Pakistan...(PMO 2009).

How should India engage Pakistan then? The semi-official report *Nonalignment 2.0* recommends 'a range of mid-level options involving the use of positive and negative levers' to break out of the pattern of a roller-coaster relationship with Pakistan in recent years.

The negative levers consist of political and military means to 'convince Pakistan that the pursuit of cross-border terrorism will not only fail to advance its objectives vis-à-vis India but also impose significant costs and risks to Pakistan's vital interests as perceived by its elite'. Regarding military strategy, it is noteworthy that the report proposes to 'move away from the notion of capturing and holding territory (however limited)' which have been the primary military objective of the Indian Armed forces,

considering the risk of escalation to the nuclear level and the danger of triggering humanitarian crises. Here, indirectly, the so-called ‘Cold Start Doctrine’ which is said to have been devised by the Indian Army after the 2001–02 crisis in order to attack Pakistan by rapid troop mobilisation, is criticised as invalid in the nuclear age¹². Actually, it has often been pointed that nuclearisation in both India and Pakistan has made the former more vulnerable to terrorist and limited attacks from the latter. The report proposes military measures which will not engender escalation, ‘conducting effective stand-off punitive operations’ including cyber and/or air power capabilities. On the political front, India ‘should not hesitate to point out Pakistan’s internal vulnerabilities’, expressing public concern over human rights violations in Balochistan and ‘Pakistan-occupied’ Kashmir, Gilgit and Baltistan. (Khilnani et al. 2012: 18-20, 39-40)

The positive levers aim to ‘create incentives for Pakistan to respond to India’s concerns and to prepare the ground for an eventual normalisation of relations with Pakistan.’ The report advises ‘maintaining channels of communication with Pakistan’ at all levels including the Pakistan Army, even in the event of a major provocation, to press military-to-military exchanges, to create constituencies that have a stake in peaceful and friendly relations with India by promoting bilateral trade, to take initiative on Pakistan’s shortages of energy and water, and to promote exchanges among civil society (Khilnani et al. 2012: 20-21). The necessities of such engagement strategies have also been emphasised by some scholars (Mato 2009). Nevertheless, it is not easy for any political leader to resist ‘democratic noises.’ Sporadic sensational incidents related to Pakistan have prevented the GOI from keeping ‘positive levers’. There would be little hope of India’s consistent engagement policy without establishing stronger federal government and more mature society including media and public

opinion. Even Modi administration, stronger federal government, has had difficulty in restarting dialogue with Pakistan as mentioned above. It seems that Prime Minister Modi and his party BJP have their own limitations as Hindu nationalist.

Having no means of stopping the possible confusion or collapse of Pakistan, India would have to prepare for certain contingencies, possible nuclear terrorism and an influx of Pakistanis. *Nonalignment 2.0* offers no answer to this question at the present stage, emphasising the need for preparing (Khilnani et al. 2012: 21-22). However, there might be no time to lose considering the gradual withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. The possibility of dominance of extremism over Af-Pak area, the worst scenario for India, cannot be denied. India might become the first country to be targeted by jihadists if such a scenario were to occur. Although India has a stake in rebuilding Afghanistan, it will be difficult to play any role there without managing relations with Pakistan as well as China (Jacob 2010). Unfortunately, India seems to have no strategy designed to stop and/or to address such a possible future.

Conclusion

China and Pakistan are the most important neighbours from an Indian strategic viewpoint. India has been challenged militarily and diplomatically by both neighbours. Taking cognizance of the historical backgrounds, unresolved territorial disputes and conflicting national ideologies, it might be little conceivable for India to make a stable and close relationship with each. Emerging India, however, has no other choice than to seek the strategy of how to address each if it were to be a global power, in that Chinese conventional and nuclear capabilities as well as Pakistan's exports of terrorism are recognised as the threats which might limit or even halt

India's growing prominence on the world stage. As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh put it repeatedly, it is an engagement strategy that presents a rational choice.

At stake is whether or not India really pursues such conduct. It is illustrative to compare the examples of the response of GOI to the intrusion incidents reported sensationally in Indian media in 2013. In January, two Indian soldiers were killed by Pakistani troops or militants who crossed over the LoC. The news that one body was found decapitated and that his head had been taken away infuriated India. Under fierce criticism, Prime Minister Singh was compelled to say, "After this barbaric act there cannot be business as usual". Although he explored the means of restarting the dialogue again when Nawaz Sharif regime, the new government of Pakistan was set up in June, another 'ceasefire violation' incident along LoC which claimed five Indian soldiers in August, has made the GOI feel reluctant for fear of adverse effects on the result of coming general elections scheduled the following year.

The same type of border tensions took place in relation to China at just about the same time. In April 2013, Chinese PLA crossed LAC and stayed for three weeks where India has its own claims. The Chinese offensive did not stop. In July, it was widely reported that China had intruded into the Indian side by land and air again. In the midst of a boiling atmosphere among media and opposition parties, however, GOI adhered to its schedule of high level meetings with China: External Minister Salman Khurshid's visit to Beijing followed by Premier Li Keqiang's visit to New Delhi in May and Defence Minister A.K. Antony's visit to Beijing in July. India has not suspended the substantive dialogue on the border dispute but has sought to strengthen the mechanism for a stable border with China. Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) signed during Prime Minister Manmohan

Singh's visit to Beijing in October of that year is not meant for resolving but managing the border dispute, avoiding using force even in case of face-offs. It is clear that India has taken more rational, pragmatic measures toward China.

This pattern of difference has remained essentially same even under the new administration led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi who was swept to power in May 2014. Its engagement policy toward Pakistan unveiled shown in the early days of government has been interrupted by its original nature as Hindu nationalist as well as by overheated media reporting on some skirmishes along the border. In contrast, Prime Minister Modi did not hesitate to hold summit meetings with Chinese leaders again and again and to welcome their huge investment in spite of PLA's intrusions into Indian side of LAC.

The difference of Indian attitude is largely attributable to the necessity of engaging China, which is larger than India¹³. China is at once an important economic partner as an emerging power and a military threat that cannot be ignored. Its power unquestionably surpasses that of India. In contrast, Pakistan, the smaller neighbour, is not regarded as sufficiently important for any Indian leader to engage militarily as well as economically to be worth the risk against an anti-Pakistan atmosphere. However, it might be Pakistan rather than China that holds the key for India now. China is increasing its status and becoming a stakeholder in the international community. Pakistan, which has nothing to lose and which also appears to be in danger of collapse, seems to have a higher probability of posing urgent and realistic threats to India.

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- 1 Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India globally attempted to challenge the bipolar order during the Cold War by mobilising newly independent nations as ‘a third force.’
 - 2 The grand old men of such strategists include the late J.N. Dixit, who served as Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor, the late K. Subrahmanyam, who was a prominent journalist and worked for the director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), and the late Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, who served as the director of the IDSA. Today’s leading active ‘strategists’ are C. Raja Mohan (journalist and scholar), Brahma Chellaney (scholar), C. Uday Bhaskar (Retired Commodore), Siddharth Varadarajan (journalist), and Harsh V. Pant (scholar).
 - 3 The Indian first ‘Strategic Partnership’ was forged with post-apartheid South Africa in 1997. Since then, India has declared the same type of relationship with the U.S. (2004), the U.K. (2004), France (1998), Germany (2001), Japan (2006), Russia (2000), China (2005), Indonesia (2005), Brazil (2006), and so on.
 - 4 Although the Government has been careful to avoid authorising the report, the authors include prominent retired officials and military veterans, ex-foreign secretary Shyam Saran and Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Prakash Menon. The incumbent National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon and Deputy Advisor Alok Prasad and Latha Reddy also joined some deliberations related to the report.
 - 5 While Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes did not hesitate to publicly call China the ‘number-one enemy’ even just before the tests, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee sent U.S. President Bill Clinton a letter just after the tests in which he mentioned, ‘an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962’, that is to say China, as an impulse for India’s nuclearisation.
 - 6 The percentage of naval allocation in all defence expenditures increased from 14.89% in 2000-01 to 18.21% in 2011-12.
 - 7 There have been concerned voices in India when Maoist-led Nepal intensified the visits of VIPs with China, and the Government of Bhutan showed the moves toward establishing diplomatic relations with China. In the former case, Prachanda, Maoist leader, alleged ‘India’s hand’ for the collapse of his government in 2009. In the latter case, India stopped fuel subsidies abruptly just before Bhutan’s general election in 2013.
 - 8 Shivshankar Menon who served as National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh questioned the validity of the concept of ‘Indo-Pacific’. (<http://www.orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/documents/Samudra-Manthan.pdf>)
 - 9 Prime Minister Modi put it boldly at the press briefing with President Xi, “respect for each other’s sensitivities and concerns; and, peace and stability in our relations and along our borders are essential for us to realize the enormous potential in our relations.” (http://pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/english-rendering-of-the-remarks-by-pm-at-the-press-briefing-with-president-xi-jinping-of-china/)

- 10 According to a 2013 opinion poll administered by BBC World Service in India, positive views of Pakistan (11%) are less widely held than of China (36%) or even North Korea (15%), and negative views of Pakistan (45%) are more widely held than of China (27%) or North Korea (23%).
- 11 According to the annual assessment of Military Balance or SIPRI Yearbook, the conventional military power of Pakistan is only half that of India. There is also some belief in the bilateral nuclear deterrence in India in spite of many doubtful views in the international community.
- 12 Cold Start doctrine, rapid mobilisation for attack, was developed on the reflection that it took so long to mobilise Indian forces to the border after the Parliament attack in 2001 that Pakistan could countermobilise their forces and the international community put diplomatic pressure on India not to open fire.
- 13 Another explanation of Indian different attitude might be descended from contrast of creation processes of acts of provocation. While India has the perception that Chinese act is endorsed by its Communist Party and Government, Pakistan's may not be controlled by the civilian government but at the discretion of Army. That is why it is rational for India to adopt diplomatic measures against the former and military measures against the latter. (Author's interview with Prof. Navnita Behera, Dec. 2013, New Delhi)

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